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Abstract
Learning-enabled controllers used in cyber-physical systems (CPS) are known to
be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Such attacks manifest as perturbations to
the states generated by the controller’s environment in response to its actions. We
consider state perturbations that encompass a wide variety of adversarial attacks
and describe an attack scheme for discovering adversarial states. To be useful, these
attacks need to be natural, yielding states in which the controller can be reasonably
expected to generate a meaningful response. We consider shield-based defenses
as a means to improve controller robustness in the face of such perturbations. Our
defense strategy allows us to treat the controller and environment as black-boxes
with unknown dynamics. We provide a two-stage approach to construct this defense
and show its effectiveness through a range of experiments on realistic continuous
control domains such as the navigation control-loop of an F16 aircraft and the
motion control system of humanoid robots.
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) approaches have shown promise in synthesizing high-quality
controllers for sophisticated cyber-physical domains such as autonomous vehicles and robotics [2, 6].
However, because these domains are characterized by complex environments with large feature
spaces, they have proven vulnerable to various kinds of adversarial attacks [9] that trigger violations
of safety conditions the controller must respect. For example, a safe controller for an unmanned
aerial navigation system must account for a myriad of factors with respect to weather, topography,
obstacles, etc., that may maliciously affect safe operation, only a fraction of which are likely to have
been considered during training. Ensuring that controllers are robust in the face of adversarial attacks
is therefore an important ongoing challenge.
Although the state space over which the controller’s actions take place is intractably large, the need to
conform to physical realism greatly reduces the attack surface available to an adversary, in practice.
For example, an adversarial attack on a UAV cannot generate an obstacle from thin air, suspend
gravity, or instantaneously eliminate prevailing wind conditions. A meaningful attack is thus expected
to generate states that are natural [9], i.e., states that can be derived from perturbations of realizable
states as defined by the physics of the application domain under consideration. We are interested in
identifying such states along a trajectory representing a rollout of the controller’s learnt policy.
Successful attacks manifest as a safety failure in this policy. While these kinds of falsification
methods are certainly important [8] to assess the overall safety of a controller, devising a defensive
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Figure 1: Simulation of a shielding defense against an adversarial attack on an Ant robotics controller. The
top row shows the effect of a successful attack. The bottom row illustrates an execution starting from the same
initial (unsafe) state augmented with a shielded defense.
strategy that prevents unsafe operation resulting from such attacks is equally valuable. In black-box,
model-free RL settings where a policy’s internal structure is unknown, shield-based defenses are
typically required [1].
This paper considers the generation of such defenses that comprise three distinct components: (1)
a mechanism to efficiently explore adversarial attacks within a realistic bounded area of the states
found in simulated and seemingly safe trajectories; (2) a detector policy that predicts safe and unsafe
states based on previously observed successful attacks; and, (3) an auxiliary policy that is triggered
whenever the detector identifies an unsafe state; the role of the policy is to propose a new action
that re-establishes a safe trajectory. To be practical, each of these components requires new insights
on adversarial attack and defense in RL. Effective attack and detection strategies in realistic cyber-
physical environments must necessarily reduce a high-dimensional state space to a lower dimensional
one focused on features most relevant to an adversarial attack. While an effective defense must be
tuned with respect to the detector to protect against identified attacks, any useful methodology must
also be able to generalize the shield to successfully prevent unseen attacks, i.e., attacks for which the
detector has not been trained against.
Our contributions are three-fold:
1. We present an adversarial testing framework that identifies natural unsafe states found near
safe ones in a simulated trajectory of learning-enabled controllers. The RL controller is
guaranteed to produce trajectories that lead to a safety violation from these states.
2. We learn detector classifier from these unsafe trajectories that precisely classify safe and
unsafe states, and auxiliary policies triggered when the detector identifies an unsafe state;
applying a shield on a presumed unsafe state yields a new safe trajectory, i.e., a trajectory
that satisfies desired safety properties.
3. We provide a detailed experimental evaluation over a range of well-studied RL benchmarks,
including the PyBullet suite of robotic environments and the F16 ground collision avoidance
system. Our results justify our claim that the robustness of black-box RL-enabled controllers
can be significantly enhanced using learning-based detection and shielding approaches,
without noticeable loss in performance.
Our overarching goal in this paper is to overcome inherent deficiencies in RL policies that do not
account for environment conditions which can be maliciously or unintentionally perturbed. These
conditions potentially comprise a large attack surface, but in the black-box setting we consider
here, fine-tuning the model is not possible. Our approach thus provides a meaningful pathway to
identify and mitigate attacks that exploit unrecognized weaknesses of the deployed model, resulting
in learning-enabled RL controllers that provide much higher degrees of assurance than the state-of-
the-art, without requiring re-training or white-box analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some relevant
background material. Section 3 formalizes the problem we consider and our goals. Section 4 presents
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details about our approach. Experimental results are given in 5. Related work and conclusions are
presented in Sections 6 and 7.
2 Background
Optimum Policies for Discrete-time Continuous Systems We consider discrete-time systems
M = 〈S,A, f,R〉 with non-linear dynamics f , continuous state space S ⊆ Rn and action space
A ⊆ Rk. Here st+1 = f(st, ut) where st ∈ S is the state at time step t and f is a complex unknown
non-linear function. The objective, given a reward function R : S × A → R, is to find a policy
pi : S → ∆(A) where ∆(A) is a probability distribution over A that maximizes the discounted
return Epi,So [
∑
t=0..T
γtR(st, at)] where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and So is the initial state
space. Given a policy pi a trajectory τ = (s0, ..., sT ) is the sequence of states obtained when
st+1 = f(st, pi(st)) up to a horizon T .
Bayesian Optimization Bayesian optimization (BO) is a black-box optimization approach which
aims at finding the global minimum for a black-box function F (x) by querying a constrained number
of times. This constraint is motivated by the expectation that evaluating the objective function often
requires significant computational resources. BO models F (x) with a prior (frequently Gaussian
Process-based) and uses an acquisition function to query values of F (x) while trading off exploration
and exploitation.
3 Problem Statement
Consider a continuous-state system M where user-defined safe (Ss) and unsafe states (Su) form a
partition over the entire state space S of M . A rollout of a trained agent policy pio on M yields a
state trajectory τo = (s0, ..., sT ). Let T (pio,M, So) be the set of safe trajectories formed by rollouts
of policy pio in the system M with initial state space So (i.e. trajectories in this set do not contain any
states in Su).
We consider the state dimensions which are used for computing the input of the agent policy pio.
These are often related to spatial characteristics such as joint position, angle, velocity, and robot
center of mass. Define a filter φ(s) that yields a subset of modifiable state dimensions. Applying φ(s)
to a trajectory τ yields φ(τ) = (φ(s0), ..., φ(sT )).
Define a -state perturbation of a state s on the filtered dimensions in φ(s) to be another state s′ ∈ S
that is within  distance away from s by varying the set of dimensions in φ(s). We choose the
L∞ norm to measure state distances. Given a state s, denote P(s) to be the set of all possible
perturbations on s.
Function Shield(state):
Given detector, pio, piaux
if detector (state) then
return piaux
else
return pio
end
Algorithm 1: Shield Defense Outline
We define an Adversarial State Attack Att(τo) to be a set
of states in which each state s ∈ Att(τo) is an -state
perturbation on a state in the trajectory τo that causes the
new trajectory to be unsafe. In other words, s ∈ Att(τo)
if, for some k and s′, 0 ≤ k ≤ T , s′ ∈ P(sk), and
executing the policy pio from s′ leads to a state in Su. This
can be thought of as a state perturbation at an arbitrary
time index along the trajectory that results in safety failure.
These perturbations can be minute, a small shift of a robot
due to a bump on the ground, or mild turbulence affecting
the positioning of a jet in midair. If  is unconstrained,
perturbations can be unrealistic, unlikely to occur in practice, or impossible to defend against given
existing environment transition dynamics. We thus concern ourselves with values of  that lead to
perturbed states in Section 5.1.
We aim to find a way to defend against adversarial state attacks leading to a more robust control
strategy that is still performant. In real-world black-box scenarios, we have no access to both
controller internals (underlying control policy) and environment conditions. Thus, an effective
defense must treat the original policy pio as a black box and make no assumptions about the (hidden)
environment dynamics. With these constraints in mind, we divide this problem into two stages. The
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first step is to detect adversarial state attacks, knowledge of which can be used to act differently,
by shielding pio from malicious state perturbations (the second step).One defense outline is in the
style of [1] where a shield modulates actions taken by pio based on the observation provided by the
environment. We structure a simple two-level function to represent the shield shown in Algorithm 1.
The upper level would be able to detect that an Att attack has occurred while the lower level would
be a policy to bring the system back to a safe state. We call the upper level function the detector and
the lower level policy the auxiliary policy (piaux ).
With this setup, the constructed defense then uses the detector to decide whether to follow the original
policy pio or switch to piaux . If these two functions are accurate, this approach is robust to adversarial
state attacks for a given . Our goal is thus to learn these two functions keeping in mind the restrictions
placed on the defense scheme.
4 Approach
Based on the definition of Adversarial State Attack Att (Section 3), given a trained policy pio,
a system M with some initial states So, we aim to find a set of state-based adversarial attacks
Adv(pio,M, So) defined as:
Adv(pio,M, So) = {s | s ∈ Att(τ) ∧ τ ∈ T (pio,M, So)}
Our defense strategy follows the outline described in Algorithm 1.
4.1 Safety Specifications
Similar to [8], we consider a safety specification ϕ consisting of multiple predicates denoted as ρ
connected using Boolean operators including conjunction and disjunction:
ϕ := ρ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ ρ := t = t′ | t 6= t′ | t ≤ t′ | t < t′ | t ≥ t′ | t > t′
A term t is any real-valued function defined over system variables. For example, consider a robot
with the height of the center of mass being z. One safe height specification ϕsafe is zsafe < z where
zsafe is a height threshold.
4.2 Attack
The search problem for Adv(pio,M, So) as defined above is in general intractable. We thus require a
more precise objective that is easy for optimization. To tractably find Adv(pio,M, So), we define
a safety reward function L(ϕ) : S → R for M . A key feature of L(ϕ) is that, given a state s ∈ S,
ϕ holds on s iff L(ϕ)(s) > 0. We define L(ρ) recursively. First, L(t < t′) := t′ − t. For the
above robot example, L(ϕsafe) := z − zsafe. We have L(t = t′) := δ[t = t′] where [·] is an
indicator function and δ is a user-configurable constant, L(t 6= t′) := L(t < t′ ∨ t > t′), and
L(t ≤ t′) := L(t < t′ ∨ t = t′). L(ϕ) is also recursively defined: L(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) := min(L(ϕ), L(ϕ′))
and L(ϕ ∨ ϕ′) := max(L(ϕ), L(ϕ′)).
Given a trajectory τ , its safety reward is
L(ϕ)(τ) = min
s∈τ L(ϕ)(s)
Attack setup With L(ϕ) defined above as an effective proxy for safety measurement, given a (set
of) trajectory τ of a system M from So i.e. τ ∈ T (pio,M, So), we search in
⋃
s∈τ
P(s) a set of state
S′ with the objective of minimizing the safety reward L(ϕ)(τ ′) where τ ′ ∈ T (pio,M, S′). Observe
that L(ϕ)(τ ′) is essentially a function over states (parameterized by the first state of τ ′ and the policy
pio). The ability of Bayesian Optimization (BO) in optimizing black-box functions (e.g. L(ϕ)(τ ′))
makes it qualified as an optimization scheme for our purpose. We thus use BO to find states in
Adv(pio,M, So) that lead to trajectories with a negative L(ϕ) reward and hence unsafe. In our
experiments, we use EI (Expected Improvement) [14] as the acquisition function and GP (Gaussian
Processes) [20] as the surrogate model.
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Feature Selection Naïve BO does not scale with the dimensionality of a controller’s feature space.
One way to improve scalability is to optimize over a reduced set of features. For example, Ghosh et al.
[8] used REMBO [25] to create a reduced input space. We apply feature selection using a 2-stage
approach. First, we run BO attacks without feature selection and collect unsafe and safe trajectories.
We then train a random forest with the collected data, selecting the top-k features based on a mean
decrease in impurity i.e. refining the filter operator φ in Sec. 3. We rerun the attack on these features
again, searching for more unsafe trajectories.
4.3 Defense
Training the Detector Our defense approach must be aware of potential unsafe states that occur
when using the original policy pio. To this end, we train a classifier (the detector) with data derived
during the attack phase. When we attack policy pio with BO, we obtain batches of trajectories via
simulation in the environment, some of which starting from states in Adv(pio,M, So) are unsafe,
and others are safe. For a safe trajectory, we label all included states as safe, while for an unsafe
trajectory τ , all states that follow a state found in Att(τ) are labelled as unsafe. Training a classifier
with this data yields a detector that differentiates between states that are safe from those that produce
unsafe trajectories affected by states in Adv(pio,M, So).
Auxiliary Policy When running a system, we use the detector to monitor current system states. If
the detector identifies a potentially vulnerable state, the defense strategy must yield an alternative
action (sequence) to prevent the agent from entering an unsafe region. The auxiliary policy should be
able to defend against attacks in Att. To obtain the final building block of our defense, we use the
trained detector to provide a reward signal for training an auxiliary policy (piaux ) with PPO [21] and
DDPG [23].
Specifically, we train piaux on a slightly modified version of M , M ′ = 〈S,A, f,RM ′〉. The reward
function RM ′ has two components:
1. We integrate the detector as a part of the reward function to train the auxiliary policy. We choose a
simple reward signal based on the detector output. For an input state of the reward function, if the
detector finds the state safe, the action is given a reward 1 and otherwise a reward 0 is given. We
call it detector reward. This reward component aims to bring the agent into a safe state identified
by the detector.
2. The safety reward defined in Sec. 4.2 is also an indicator of safety. A straightforward way to
use this information is to add it as well to the reward signal for training the auxiliary policy.
Optimizing the safety reward of each rollout maximizes policy safety. This reward component
encourages piaux to behave safely.
Deployment of the defense Intuitively, piaux only focuses on safety and does not care about per-
formance. Running the original policy pio in tandem with piaux (Algorithm 1) can retain performance
provided by pio while ensuring safety provided by piaux .
5 Experiments
PyBullet A number of our experiments are conducted in PyBullet [5], a well-studied open-source
suite of robotic environments. The specific environments tested on were the Ant, HalfCheetah,
Hopper and Humanoid robots. The objective of each of these environments is to stay upright and
sustain forward motion. The robots are modeled using the velocity, orientation, and position of their
joints. For example, Ant’s 8-D action space is used to control each individual motor while navigating
its 29-D state space. Its observation has 28 dimensions consisting of 4 dimensions of feet contact
information, and 24 dimensions of joint information with body location and velocity. Its primary
safety constraint is to remain upright; additional details are provided in Appendix A.3. For more
details of the environments, one may refer to the models’ XML definition in the PyBullet repo 1. For
the attacked policy, we used an open-source implementation of popular RL algorithms [12] with the
1PyBullet Mujoco XML definitions
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saved models provided2 which are trained on stochastic versions of the environment (to simulate
sensor noise).
F16 Ground Collision Avoid System The F16 environment is a model of the jet’s navigation
control system[11]. The F16 is modeled with 16 variables and with non-linear differential equations
as dynamics. The safety constraints are provided based on the aircraft flight limits and boundaries of
the model. Our objective is to keep the jet level and flying within the specified constraints. Further
details on the state dimensions, initialization and safety bounds are given in Appendix A.2. The
attacked policy of this model is trained with PPO.
Classic Control Environments In addition to the above environments, we include several classical
control benchmarks including (Inverted) Pendulum, n-Car platoon and large helicopter. The (Inverted)
Pendulum’s goal is to swing a pendulum to vertical. n-Car platoon models multiple (n) vehicles
forming a platoon maintaining a safe distance relative to one another [22]. Large helicopter [7]
models a helicopter with 28 variables and has constraints on each variables. These benchmarks’
constraints are provided in Appendix A.1. We trained the Helicopter with DDPG while the other
models use the pretrained DDPG [23] policies given in [27].
5.1 Evaluation
Benchmarks
dims
(obs/state)
simu. traj.
length
Attack
ε
rand.
attack
BO
attack
defense
succ. rate
attack improvement
using shielded policy
Hopper-a2c
15/12 1000 0.001
1.29% 2.18% 91.40% 43.51%
Hopper-ppo 0.41% 5.27% 97.80% 27.97%
Hopper-trpo 1.71% 1.97% 97.90% 48.16%
HalfCheetah-a2c
26/17 1000 0.02
0.36% 9.43% 91.40% 34.46%
HalfCheetah-acktr 0.90% 14.54% 92.80% 65.23%
HalfCheetah-ddpg 1.63% 11.84% 88.20% 67.27%
HalfCheetah-ppo2 0.38% 4.68% 97.80% 50.53%
HalfCheetah-sac 4.40% 5.88% 97.90% 62.12%
HalfCheetah-trpo 0.77% 4.83% 97.90% 49.02%
Ant-a2c
28/29 1000 0.0075
0.17% 1.26% 82.60% 66.20%
Ant-ddpg 0.42% 4.43% 94.30% 93.57%
Ant-ppo 1.47% 11.78% 88.70% 91.39%
Ant-sac 2.82% 14.83% 96.00% 94.02%
Ant-td3 5.79% 12.79% 93.60% 72.52%
Humanoid-ppo 44/47 1000 0.001 0.38% 2.00% 91.90% 22.93%
Pendulum-ddpg 2/2 200 * 0.03% 8.72% 100.00% 100.00%
4carploon-ddpg 7/7 1000 * 0.01% 3.82% 100.00% 94.71%
8carploon-ddpg 15/15 2000 * 0.72% 4.13% 100.00% 100.00%
Helicopter-ddpg 28/28 2000 * 0.00% 0.26% 100.00% 100.00%
F16-ppo 8/16 2000 * 0.01% 2.60% 96.40% 96.69%
* Use allowed variance of initial state which is given by the benchmark itself
Table 1: Experimental Results. Benchmarks are of the form, E-A where E is the Environment and A
is the type of controller attacked.
Selecting Attack Range As mentioned in Sec. 3, an Adversarial State Attack Att requires a
meaningful ε-state perturbation. We choose ε with following strategy. For a specific robot in the
PyBullet benchmarks, we initialized our ε to be 0.001. We randomly perturbed initial states and run
simulations 1000 times for every available policy. If there is a policy that does not find any unsafe
states, we increase ε by 0.0005, and repeat this process until unsafe states are found in all policies.
We believe this is a sensible strategy because none of these benchmarks are equipped with constraint
specifications that indicate the range of acceptable states that can be generated by the environment.
For all the other benchmarks, constraints on these ranges were available and used directly.
Attack Results Table 1 shows two attack strategies. The first, rand. attack indicates the percentage
of safety violations detected when initializing the state randomly around a sampled trajectory with
2RL pretrained policy
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respect to the chosen ε. For each benchmark, we randomly sampled 40K states within the bounds
determined by ε and initialized the simulations accordingly. Column BO attack shows the attack
success rate when using BO to discover attacks. The GPs of the method are initialized with 10
randomly sampled states and the BO algorithm samples the safety reward 30 times. For each state
in one trajectory, we generate 40 sampled trajectories. If the length of an attacked trajectory was
L, 40 × L trajectories would be collected in one attack. We then count the unsafe trajectories in
these simulations. For high-dimensional benchmarks like Humanoid, our attack focused on the top
20% most important features (9 features); these features were selected using the approach described
in 4.2. With this feature reduction in place, our technique achieves an average 2% attack success
rate, compared to just a 0.38% success rate using a randomized attack strategy. Results for other
dimension reduction choices are given in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Attack success rate for Humanoid-ppo
under different feature dimension reduction per-
centages.
Defense Results We trained detectors with the
states generated by our attack and learned auxil-
iary policies with the detector and corresponding
safety reward. We measured the quality of our
defense in two ways. First, we want to know
how successful our detector and auxiliary poli-
cies are in preventing attacks on the original
policy that would otherwise lead to a safety vi-
olation. Second, given a shielded policy, i.e., a
policy that integrates the original, defense, and
auxiliary policy, we measure how effective this
combined policy is in reducing the number of
unsafe states available to an attack, compared to
the original policy.
To answer the first question, we run BO attacks on the original policy, employing our detector and
shield policy to detect and avoid unsafe trajectories. Note that we may still find unsafe trajectories
because not all attacks are necessarily preventable for reasons discussed below. The defense success
rate on the PyBullet benchmarks ranges from 82.6% to 100%. On the simpler classical control
benchmarks, the defense success rate can achieve 100% while the F16GCAS benchmark has a 96.4%
defense success rate. These results support our claim that ε-state perturbations used in adversarial
attacks in these environments can be effectively mitigated. We note that our defense method does
not provide verifiable guarantees of safety. There are two primary reasons for this: a) the possible
existence of states in our attack which are not recoverable by any policy (eg: a robot whose forward
momentum will cause it to fall regardless of any possible shield action that may be taken); and, b)
covariate shift due to our black-box setting that does not provide insight into environment dynamics,
making it impossible to provide guarantees on detector accuracy during testing since the detector and
auxiliary policy are trained only with the adversarial states discovered by previously seen BO attacks.
In other words, even if the detector is accurate, it is also untenable to assert that the auxiliary policy
(piaux ) trained by RL is always reliable due to variations while training.
The attack improvement using shielded policy column shows the percentage reduction in unsafe
states discovered by a BO attack when applied to the shielded policy as compared to the original.
The trajectories admitted by the shielded policy are more constrained than the original since the
policy is derived as a mixture of both the original and the auxiliary (safety) policy. Consequently,
we would expect a fewer number of unsafe states to be discoverable under this new policy when
compared against a policy in which safety was not taken into account. Indeed, the results shown in
the column justify this intuition. For all benchmarks, the use of a shielded policy reduces the number
of unsafe states found by a BO attack by at least 22.93%. The use of this blended policy on the three
Classical Control tasks demonstrates 100% empirical robustness, while the F16 benchmark is very
close behind at 96.69%. Several of the PyBullet benchmarks such as Ant-ddpg and Ant-sac show
similar improvement.
Performance of the Shielded Policy The experiments in Figure 3 investigate the impact of consid-
ering safety (and thus shield interventions) on performance. We randomly initialized the simulation
around the attacked trajectory within a range bounded by ε. For each benchmark, we run a simulation
1000 times and count the (normalized) average return yielded with the original policy and shielded
policy. The y-axis is the trajectory return scaled by a constant shared among each environment’s
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Figure 3: Average Reward for Original Policy and Shielded Policy
benchmarks. It represents the performance of the corresponding policy(i.e., moving fast with low
electricity cost). The result in Figure 3 supports our claim that the cost of shield interventions is
typically modest, on average only 5.78% variance compared to the performance exhibited by the
original.
6 Related Work
As discovered in [13], by adding tiny or even invisible perturbations to inputs at each time-step,
neural network RL policies are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which can lead to abnormal system
behavior and significant performance drop. Simple generation algorithms such as fast gradient sign
method (FSGM) [10] can craft adversarial examples for some RL algorithms that are less resistant
to adversarial attack. However, our approach can effectively attack a wide range of modern RL
algorithms. In the black-box setting where gradient information is not available, [4] proposed a policy
induction attack that exploits the transferability of adversarial examples [24]. To attack, it obtains
adversarial state perturbations from a replica of the victim’s network, e.g. using FSGM, and trains
the replica to simulate the victim’s network. In contrast, our approach does not attempt to replicate
the victim’s network but uses Bayesian optimization and dimension reduction to approximate only
part of the search space that is relevant to insecure model behavior. [15] also proposed to find
adversarial attacks in the black-box setting. It pushes the RL agent to achieve the expected state
under the current state by generating adversarial perturbations from action sequence planning enabled
by model-based learning. As opposed to this approach, our work is model-free as we do not need
to learn an environment model to guide the search of adversarial examples. While using Bayesian
optimization for crafting adversarial examples was previously explored in [8], that work focuses on
environment parameters such as initial and goal states. Our work exploits Bayesian optimization to
attack at various time-steps in a rollout. In [9], the attacker solves an RL problem to generate an
adversarial policy creating natural observations and acting in a multi-agent environment to defeat the
victim policy. The setting of our problem is substantially different as we assume the input distribution
to the victim policy is not significantly changed at test time to better mirror realistic behaviors.
Importantly, our technique differs from these previous approaches by training an auxiliary policy to
shield and defend the victim network.
To defend an RL policy, prior work has applied adversarial training to improve the robustness of
deep RL policies. Adversarial RL training fine-tunes the victim policy against adversary policies by
exerting a force vector or randomizing many of the physical properties of the system like friction
coefficients [17, 19, 16, 18]. The trained policy can robustly operate in the presence of adversarial
polices that apply disturbance forces to the system. Defenses based on this idea also generalize to
multi-agent RL environments [9] which shows that repeated fine-tuning can provide protection to a
victim policy against a range of adversarial opponents. Our approach differs from these techniques
because we consider black-box settings, and do not attempt to fine-tune the internals of a victim
policy. Instead, a shield-based auxiliary policy is trained to improve the victim policy’s resistance to
adversarial perturbations. There exists recent work that synthesizes verified shields to protect RL
policies leveraging formal methods [27, 3, 26]. However, unlike our approach, these techniques do
not scale to high-dimensional environment and adversarial disturbances.
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7 Conclusions
Learning-enabled controllers for CPS systems are subject to adversarial attacks in which small
perturbations to the states generated by an environment in response to a controller’s actions can lead
to violations of important safety conditions. In this paper, we present a new framework that uses
directed attack generation to learn defense policies that accurately differentiate between safe and
unsafe states and an auxiliary shielding policy that aims to recover from an unsafe state. Notably,
our methodology operates in a completely black-box setting in which environment dynamics are
unknown. Experimental results demonstrate our approach is highly effective over a range of realistic
sophisticated controllers, with only modest impact on overall performance.
8 Broader Impact
Machine learning has demonstrated impressive success in a variety of applications relevant to the core
thrust of this paper. In particular, autonomous systems such as self-driving cars, UUVs, UAVs, etc.
are examples of the kind of learning-enabled CPS systems whose design and structure are consistent
with the applications considered here. These systems are characterized by intractably large state
spaces, only a small fraction of which are explored during training. Because the space of possible
environment actions is so large, it is unrealistic to expect that the environment models learnt used to
train these controllers represent all possible behaviors likely to be observed in deployment. These
covariate shifts can affect controller behavior resulting in violations of important safety constraints.
These violations can have significant negative repercussions in light of the common use case for these
applications which often involves operating in environments with high levels of human activity. Our
shielding policy shows significant benefit in improving controller safety without requiring expensive
retraining post-deployment.
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A Benchmark Constraints
We present the initial constraints and safety constraints for all benchmarks in this section.
A.1 Classical Control
The classical control benchmarks and pretrained models come from [27]. Initial and safety constraints
are in table 2.
Table 2: Classical Control Benchmarks
Benchmarks Initial Constraints Safety Constraints
Pendulum −0.3 < xi < 0.3, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 −0.5 < xi < 0.5, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 1
4CarPloon −0.1 < xi < 0.1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6 −2 < x0 < 2, −0.5 < x1,3,5 < 0.5,−0.35 < x2 < 0.35, −1 < x4,6 < 1
8CarPloon −0.1 < xi < 0.1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 14 −2 < x0 < 2,−0.5 < x1,3,5,7,9,11,13 < 0.5,−1 < x2,4,6,8,10,12,14 < 1
Helicoptor
−0.002 < xi < 0.002, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7
−0.0023 < xi < 0.0023, for 8 ≤ i ≤ 27
−10 < x13 < 10, −9 < x14 < 9
−8 < xi < 8, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 27 ∧ i 6= 13, 14
A.2 F16GCAS
The F16GCAS benchmark is modelled with 16 variables. The meaning of each, along with initial
space and constraints are shown in Table 3. When the initial space is 0, this variable is always
initialized with 0.
Table 3: F16 Ground Collision Avoidance System
Variables Meanings Initial Space Safety Constraints Units
V Airspeed [491, 545] [300, 2500] ft/s
α Angle of attach [0.00337, 0.00374] [-0.1745, 0.7854] rad
β Angle of side-slip 0 [-0.5236, 0.5236] rad
φ Roll angle [0.714, 0.793] (-inf, inf) rad
θ Pitch angle [-1.269, -1.142] (-inf, inf) rad
ψ Yaw angle [-0.793, -0.714] (-inf, inf) rad
P Roll rate 0 (-inf, inf) rad/s
Q Pitch rate 0 (-inf, inf) rad/s
R Yaw rate 0 (-inf, inf) rad/s
pn Northward displacement 0 (-inf, inf) ft
pe Eastward displacement 0 (-inf, inf) ft
h Altitude [3272, 3636] [0, 45000] ft
pow Engine thrust [8.18, 9.09] (-inf, inf) lbf∫
Nze Integral of down force error 0 [-3, 15] g’s∫
Pse Integral of stability roll rate error 0 [-2500, 2500] rad∫
(Ny + r)e Integral of side force & yaw rate error 0 (-inf, inf) mixed
A.3 Pybullet
For initial constraints, one may refer to robot_locomotors.py in the pybullet repo3. The initial
spaces of different joints are defined in the robot_specific_reset() function. Safety constraints
are defined in the alive_bonus() function in the same file. These constraints focus on 2 variables,
the height z and the pitch p of the robot, as well as the joint contacts with the ground. When the
alive_bonus() returns a value that is smaller than 0, the agent violates these constraints and the
simulation terminates immediately. We present the safety constraints in Table 4.
3pybullet robot_locomotors.py
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Table 4: PyBullet Benchmarks safety constraints
Benchmarks Safety Constraints
Hopper z > 0.8 ∧ |p| < 1
HalfCheetah ¬contact(joint1, 2, 4, 5) ∧ |p| < 1
Ant z > 0.26
Humanoid z > 0.78
¬contact means that the joints do not contact with the ground.
B Attack Transferability
Transferability is a general property of many adversarial attacks. Recall that given a policy pi0 in a
system M with initial states S0, an adversarial set Adv(pi0,M, S0) is discovered with a Bayesian
Optimization (BO) attack. Now, considering another policy pi1 on the same system M , we wish to
know what percentage of Adv(pi0,M, S0) is also an adversarial state for policy pi1. We call this
the transferable ratios for the benchmark. Several policies trained with different RL algorithms
are available on the Ant, HalfCheetah, and Hopper environments. We measured the adversarial
transferability between these different policies trained for the same robot system. Figure 4 shows
these results.
Figure 4: Attack transferability between a given robot’s policies. Each row is the adversarial state
ratio of one adversarial state set on different policies. i.e, for Hopper, the row a2c, column ppo means
13% of the adversarial state set of a2c are also adversary states for ppo. The diagonal is always 100%
because states of one policy’s adversary dataset are always unsafe for that algorithm. The numbers in
the tables are the transferable ratios.
Because adversarial states can be transferred between different policies, the transferable ratio varies
on different systems and policies. For HalfCheetah, adversarial states are less likely to be transferred
into other policies when compared with Hopper and Ant. It is also true that an adversary state set
can have a relatively high transferable ratio overall policies. For example, the adversarial state of
Ant-ddpg(row) has greater than a 78% transferable ratio on all policies. On the contrary, an adversary
state set can also have a low transferable ratio for all policies excepted for its own as evidenced
by HalfCheetah-sac(row). A policy can be vulnerable or resistant to the adversarial state of other
policies. For example, Hopper-a2c(column) has 98% and 97% transferable ratio on adversarial states
for ppo and trpo respectively, while the Hopper-ppo(column) has only 13% and 23% transferable
ratio on adversarial states for a2c and trpo, respectively.
C Feature Importance
Not all features in an application are equally related to safety specifications. Taking the Humanoid
robot as an example - its safety specification ϕ is to stay upright (z > 0.78). This goal is directly
dependent on the height of the robot, thus the height feature is highly related to safety. By apply-
ing feature selection on the attack results, we can rank feature importance automatically. In our
experiments, we selected the top-20% most important features to reduce the attack dimension (the
dimension of filter φ defined in Section 4) of Humanoid-ppo. Their importance is marked as orange
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Figure 5: Humanoid-ppo & F16GCAS-ppo Feature Importance
in Figure 5. We also analyzed the feature importance of the F16 Ground Collision Avoidance System
in Figure 5. The top-3 important features related to the ground collision are airspeed, pitch angle, and
attitude in order.
D Shield Intervention Analysis
If the shield does not adequately intervene with the original policy, the original policy is vulnerable
to states found in Adv. On the contrary, since our auxiliary policies are only trained to assist the
original policy to be safe, too many shield interventions initiated by auxiliary policies can reduce the
performance of the system. To measure the impact of shield interventions, we crafted experiments
to control the number of interventions. Given an input state s, our detector gives scores to safe and
unsafe labels, and outputs the label with the higher score. For state s, suppose the scores which the
detector gives to the safe and unsafe labels are Ssafe(s) and Sunsafe(s) respectively. In the general
setting, if Ssafe(s) > Sunsafe(s), the detector marks s as safe. Now, we change this setting as the
detector can mark s safe iff Ssafe(s) > Sunsafe(s) + C. Otherwise, mark s as unsafe. C is an
approximating constant - as it increases, more states will be marked as unsafe, thus there will be
more shield interventions triggered by the auxiliary policy. For small values of C, more states will be
marked as safe, and thus fewer shield interventions will be triggered.
Thus, by changing the value of the approximating constant, we can measure the relationship between
defense success rates and shield interventions, as well as the relationship between performance
and shield interventions. For the first case, we initialized our simulation with all the states in
the adversarial state set Adv(pi0,M, S0) for original policy pi0. In this case, if there is no shield
intervention, the system will violate the safety specification. For the second one, we measured the
performance reward by initializing the system around one trajectory, which is the same setting as
described in Section 5.1. We decide the range of the approximating constant with the detector training
set derived from the attack phase. For each state s in the training set, we calculated the difference
Ssafe(s) − Sunsafe(s) and selected the smallest and largest difference as the lower bound l and
upper bound h of the approximating constant. Given a sample range [l, h], when C > h, all states in
this set will be marked as unsafe; when C < h, all states in this set will be marked as safe. For each
benchmark, we sample 10 approximating constant values in this interval equally separated.
We analyzed shielded policies on Ant in Fig 6. As the approximating constant C increases, more
interventions are involved and the defense success rate increases. However, the performance reward
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decreases dramatically due to these increasing interventions. The results on HalfCheetah are shown
in Figure 7. Similar to Ant, as C increases, the defense success rate also increases. For most policies,
the performance reward decreases as C increased, but when policies are not well-trained, such as
PPO, the performance reward actually increases since the system becomes safer and thus the robot
learns a more accurate reward. The results of Hopper and Humanoid are shown in Figure 8 and
Figure 9, respectively. Unlike the results shown for Ant and Halfcheetah, we find that too many
interventions can lead to unsafety. This is because the auxiliary policies are only trained to assist the
original policy. As long as it can pull the system to safe states for the original policies, it can gain a
decent reward. However, the auxiliary policy itself may not be a safe policy independently. On the
other hand, if the number of interventions is small, the system is vulnerable to the following states in
Adv. Our shielded policies perform best when C is around 0 since the auxiliary policy is trained
under the instruction of detector when C is 0. Similar to Ant and HalfCheetah, when C > 0, the
performance reward decreases as the number of interventions increases on Hopper and Humanoid.
Results of classical control and F16GCAS benchmarks are in Figure 10. Excessive interventions
on the (inverted) pendulum, 4-carploon, and 8-carploon can make the system unsafe and decrease
performance reward. When interventions are infrequent, these applications become vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations. Shielded policies worked best when C is close to 0. For Helicopter and
F16GCAS, more interventions lead to safer behavior without comprising performance.
Figure 6: Ant Shield Intervention Analysis
Figure 7: HalfCheetah Shield Intervention Analysis
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Figure 8: Hopper Shield Intervention Analysis
Figure 9: Humanoid Shield Intervention Analysis
Figure 10: Classical Control & F16GCAS Shield Intervention Analysis
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E Hyper-parameters
E.1 Attack Hyper-parameters
When running the Bayesian optimization attack, we used the same hyper-parameters for all bench-
marks. The acquisition function is Expected Improvement (EI). The ξ of EI is 0.01. We use Gaussian
Process (GP) with Matern kernel as a surrogate model. The hyper-parameters of the Matern kernel
use the default tuned values in the skopt 4 library. Before approximating the initial state-reward
function with GP, we randomly sample 10 points. We then evaluate the initial state-reward function
with points gotten by optimizing on acquisition function 30 times.
E.2 Defense Hyper-parameters
The Hopper’s detectors are random forests. Each of them has 100 trees with 50 max depth. The other
detectors are neural networks. The search categories of neural network detectors’ hyper-parameters
are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Hyper-parameters of Neural Network Detector
Hyper-parameter Search Categories
Network Structure obs_dim x 128 x 128 x 128 x 2
Learning Rate [1e-4, 1e-3]
Mini-batch Size [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
Training Epoch [5, 10, 20, 50]
Optimizer Adam
The auxiliary policies of Hopper, HalfCheetah and Ant are trained with DDPG, while the Humanoid,
classical control and F16GCAS benchmarks are equipped with PPO auxiliary policy. The search
categories of the auxiliary policy are listed in table 6 and 7.
Table 6: Hyper-parameters of DDPG
Parameters Search Categories
Actor Network Structure obs_dim x 64 x 64 x action_dim
Critic Network Structure obs_dim x 64 x 64 x 1
Discount Factor γ [0.99, 0.999]
Update Rate τ [1e-3, 1e-4]
others Default values 5
Table 7: Hyper-parameters of PPO
Parameters Search Categories
Policy Network Structure obs_dim x 128 x 128 x action_dim
Training Step [1e5, 5e5, 1e6, 2e6, 4e6]
Clipping Range [0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2]
Discount Factor (γ) [0.99, 0.999, 1]
Entropy Cocfficicnt 0.01
GAE (λ) 0.95
Gradient Norm Clipping 0.5
Learning Rate [2.5e-3, 2.5e-4, 2.5e-5]
Number of Actors [4, 8, 16]
Optimizer Adam
Training Epochs per Update [4, 10]
Training Mini-batches per Update [4, 16, 64, 128]
Unroll Length/n-step [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
Value Function Coefficient 0.5
4skopt.gp_minimize
5Stable-Baselines DDPG
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